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ABSTRACT
This paper offers an empirical test of ownership mix efficiency in the U.S. hospital services industry.
The test compares the benefits of quality assurance with the costs from the attenuation of property
rights that result from an increased presence of nonprofit organizations. The empirical results suggest
that too many not-for-profit and public hospitals may exist in the typical market area of the U.S. The
policy implication is that more quality of care per dollar might be obtained by attracting a greater
percentage of for-profit hospitals into some market areas. This conclusion, however, is tempered
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I.  Introduction 
 
Health care spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product has been on the 
rise again in the United States, with an increase from 13.3 percent in 2000 to 14.9 
percent  in  2002  (Levit  et  al.,  2004).  A  considerable  share  of  this  growth  can  be 
attributed to the hospital services sector of the health economy because expenditures 
on hospital services account for 36 percent of all personal health care spending. The 
observed  high  level  of  spending  in  this  sector  has  sometimes  been  linked  to  the 
inefficient use of resources by nonprofit organizations, which may result from the 
attenuation of property rights incentives.  
Hansmann  (1980)  notes  that  nonprofit  organizations  face  a  non-distribution 
constraint because they cannot legally distribute any of their residual earnings. By 
law,  nonprofit  organizations  must  dispense  all  residual  earnings  for  the  express 
educational,  charitable,  or  religious  purposes  for  which  they  were  formed.    As  a 
result, economists are quick to point out that nonprofit organizations are likely to face 
a more severe principal-agent problem than for-profits. In particular, the absence of a 
residual  claimant  with  a  financial  interest  in  the  organization  means  that  no  one 
individual, or group of individuals, has strong incentives to monitor the behavior of 
the organization.  Therefore, in a nonprofit health care organization, the divergence 
between the interests of the principal(s) and the agent(s) often leads to the inefficient 
production and provision of medical care services. This occurs because unconstrained 
managers of nonprofit organizations are more inclined to pursue personal goals and 
objectives,  which  are  likely  to  conflict  with  minimum  cost  production,  ceteris   4 
paribus.  Consequently,  property-rights  theory  predicts  that  a  nonprofit  healthcare 
organization,  in  isolation,  will  produce  medical  services  at  higher  costs  than  an 
otherwise comparable for-profit organization.  
However, if nonprofits do produce with higher costs, as property-rights theory 
predicts, it becomes unclear why nonprofit organizations are so dominant in many 
health care markets.  Arrow (1963) has cleared up some of this ambiguity by pointing 
out that medical care is a highly complex personal service, one for which there exists 
considerable uncertainty surrounding quality.  Accordingly, one hypothesis for the 
prevalence  of  nonprofits  in  healthcare  markets  is  that  nonprofit  ownership  status 
serves as a signal for quality in the presence of asymmetric information.   
In this case, the non-distribution constraint implies nonprofit organizations face 
little  financial  incentive  to  compromise  the  quality  of  care  they  provide  when 
consumers  face  asymmetric  information.    This  is  in  contrast  to  for-profit 
organizations, which clearly confront financial incentives to engage in opportunistic 
behavior, such as skimping on the quality of care they provide, when consumers are 
imperfectly  informed.  Thus,  economic  theory  suggests  that  an  isolated  nonprofit 
healthcare  organization  may  offer  higher  levels  of  quality  than  an  otherwise 
comparable for-profit organization.   
  While theory tends to be unambiguous in predicting that an “isolated” nonprofit 
organization will produce medical care with higher quality and production costs than 
an otherwise similar for-profit organization, both Hirth (1999) and Grabowski and 
Hirth  (2002)  have  pointed  out  that  nonprofit  and  for-profit  organizations  rarely 
operate  in  isolation;  in  fact,  they  often  compete  against  one  another  in  the  same   5 
market area. They hypothesize that competitive spillovers from nonprofits may lead 
to a higher quality of care in for-profit organizations.  In support of this theory, the 
researchers  find  empirical  evidence  that  an  increase  in  nonprofit  market  share 
improves for-profit, and overall, nursing home quality.  
  Grabowski and Hirth (2002), and much earlier, Tuckman and Chang (1988), also 
note  that  competitive  spillovers  from  for-profits  may  influence  the  behavior  of 
nonprofit organizations because competition from for-profit organizations may limit 
the inefficiency of nonprofits. Inefficiency is limited because nonprofits have to be 
more concerned with the costs of producing medical care when facing competition 
from  the  more  cost  conscious  for-profit  organizations.
1    Grabowski  and  Hirth 
conclude  (p.  19)  that  ‘If  non-profits  have  a  competitive  advantage  in 
“trustworthiness” while for-profits have greater incentives for efficiency, intersectoral 
competition can yield better outcomes than a market consisting exclusively of one 
type of firm.’ 
  Based upon the notion that a mix of for-profit and nonprofit organizations may 
promote societal well being, this paper develops and conducts a unique empirical test 
to assess the efficiency of the ownership mix in the typical hospital services market. 
As previously discussed, the existence of both nonprofit and for-profit organizations 
in a single market area can be expected to generate both social benefits and costs. By 
empirically estimating the relationship between the nonprofit (or for-profit) market 
share and the utilization of hospital services at the market level, we can infer the net 
social benefit of additional nonprofit facilities. We discuss this in the next section of 
this paper and also explain how we plan to conduct the empirical test.  Section III   6 
describes the data and sample used in the empirical analyses. Section IV presents the 
empirical findings and the last section offers conclusions, caveats, and suggestions for 
future research.  
 
II.  Conceptual Model 
 
The  method  we  employ  to  test  for  the  efficient  mix  of  for-profit  and  nonprofit 
hospitals  in  a  geographical  market  is  derived  from  Svorney  (1987).  Svorney 
examined the role of professional interests in establishing physician licensure. She 
argued that physician licensure potentially raises costs through higher wages because 
it acts as an entry barrier, but, she emphasized, licensure may also provide greater 
benefits  in  the  form  of  quality  assurance.  The  ultimate  test  of  the  efficiency  of 
professional licensure, she argued, depends on whether or not the favorable demand 
response outweighs the undesirable supply response.  For example, if the benefit of 
quality assurance causes demand to increase more than higher wages cause supply to 
decrease, then the utilization of physician services increases, and this reflects the net 
social benefit that physician licensure offers.
2 Hence, one may observe the impact of 
a regulation (or type of institution) on the utilization of a particular good or service, 
and from that draw an inference about its effect on economic efficiency. 
In  a  similar  vein,  the  efficiency  of  a  mix  of  health  care  organizations  with 
different ownership forms may be analyzed in this manner.  For example, and in the 
context  of  this  research,  suppose  we  are  comparing  two  similar  hospital  services 
markets that differ in the following respect: market area “A” is completely dominated 
by  for-profit  facilities  whereas  market  area  “B”  is  characterized  by  an  equal   7 
distribution of market shares across for-profit and nonprofit facilities.  A graphical 
exposition of this comparison is presented in figure 1 for a competitive marketplace. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 The curves DA and SA represent the demand and supply for hospital services in 
market A (where for-profit facilities completely dominate). Notice that QA measures 
the market clearing quantity of hospital services in market A. 
Given the different mix of ownership structures, the markets are likely to differ in 
two principle respects, ceteris paribus. First, a greater demand for hospital services 
will  exist  in  market  area  B  because  of  the  increased  quality  assurance  resulting 
directly (or indirectly) from the greater prevalence of nonprofit organizations. This 
higher level of quality assurance is captured by demand curve DB in figure 1. Second, 
the supply of hospital services may be lower in market area B because of the higher 
production costs resulting from the diminished property-rights incentives from the 
greater proportion of nonprofit hospitals operating in the market. Higher production 
costs  are  reflected  in  supply  curve  SB  in  figure  1.  Because  the  demand  (quality 
assurance) effect is assumed to be stronger than the cost effect in our example, the 
equilibrium quantity of hospital services, QB, is greater in market B than in market A. 
  Whether  or  not  the  demand  effect  more  than  offsets  the  supply  effect  in  the 
typical market for hospital services is an empirical question that can be tested using 
standard regression techniques.  The test can be conducted by observing the impact 
that the nonprofit (or for-profit) market share has on hospital care utilization, while 
carefully  controlling  for  a  host  of  other  supply  and  demand  factors.  Equation  1 
represents  the  general  reduced-form  model  used  in  the  forthcoming  statistical   8 
estimations. In equation 1,  i Q  represents the equilibrium quantity of hospital care in 
market i;  i NPS  represents the market share held by not-for-profit hospitals in market 
i;
 3 PSi stands for the market share held by public or government hospitals in market i; 
ji D  is a vector of j additional variables that are expected to influence the demand for 
hospital care in market i; and  ki S  is a vector of k additional variables hypothesized to 
affect the supply of hospital care in market i. The error term, i m , is assumed to be 
independent  and  normally  distributed  with  constant  variance  and  a  mean  of  zero 
(fixed effects in equation 1 have been suppressed for algebraic convenience).   
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  The coefficients on the not-for-profit and public hospital shares reflect whether 
the two ownership forms generate positive or negative net benefits at the margin. For 
example, if b0 < 0 the benefit of quality assurance (i.e., demand increases) is less than the 
costs resulting form the diminished property rights incentives (i.e., supply decrease). In 
this case, the results would indicate that too  many not-for-profits exist in the typical 
market area. If b0 > 0, however, the opposite scenario holds.  Finally, if b0 = 0 this 
suggests that an efficient mix of not-for-profit and for-profit organizations exist in the 
typical market area.
4 The same logic holds for the public market share variable and the 
coefficient b1. 
 
   9 
III. Data and Empirical Test 
In  our  test,  the  metropolitan  statistical  area  (MSA)  was  assumed  to  be  a  reasonable 
approximation for the relevant geographical market (RGM) for hospital services. While 
this definition of the RGM is not without its weaknesses (Dranove and White, 1994), 
urban hospital markets are commonly defined in this manner for empirical research (e.g., 
Joskow, 1980; Manheim, Bazzoli, and Sohn, 1994; Spang, Bazzoli, and Arnould, 2001; 
Douglas and Ryman, 2003).  Only community hospitals were included in the analysis 
because they provide a similar cluster of inpatient services and therefore operate in the 
same relevant product market.   Access to necessary data such as the uninsured rate, the 
penetration rate of health maintenance organizations, and the Medicare managed care 
penetration rate prevented us from extending the empirical analysis to all 320 MSAs in 
the U.S. But the 90 MSA observations, for which we could obtain all of the required data, 
account  for  75  percent  of  the  population  in  the  U.S.  The  data  used  in  our  empirical 
analyses are for the year 1999 and come from Health Forum (2002) and the Agency for 
Health Care Research and Quality.
5  Table 1 reports the mean value, standard deviation, 
and data source for each of the variables used in our empirical analyses.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The  conceptual  model  indicates  that  a  measure  of  hospital  care  utilization,  or 
quantity,  i Q ,  is  necessary  to  conduct  the  test.  We  employed  several  measures  of 
utilization:  number  of  admissions,  inpatient  beds,  inpatient  days,  surgeries,  outpatient 
visits, and emergency room visits. All of these indicators were measured on a per capita 
basis.  Because good instruments are unavailable, we were unable to test and correct for 
the possibility that the market shares based on ownership are endogenous from a market   10 
perspective.  While  an  endogenous  market  share  is  indeed  a  possibility,  there  are 
nevertheless  strong  theoretical  and  institutional  reasons  to  treat  the  hospital  services 
market  shares  based  on  ownership  as  being  exogenous.  Evidence  suggests  that  these 
market shares tend to change very little from one year to the next. In fact, Grabowski and 
Hirth (2002) note that the relative share of nonprofit hospitals in different parts of the 
country may be deeply rooted in historical factors such as the age of the city and different 
patterns of voluntarism and charitable provision that have little to do with the advanced 
technology and prevalence of third party payment that characterize the current health care 
environment.  However, as Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) have shown, when faced 
with the choice of using weak instruments and no instruments at all, the latter is often the 
best empirical strategy because weak instruments may lead to large inconsistencies in the 
IV-generated  estimates.    Moreover,  if  endogeneity  is  present,  IV  estimates  in  finite 
samples will still be biased in the same direction as OLS-generated estimates.   
As  previously  mentioned,  in  an  effort  to  isolate  the  impact  of  ownership  mix  on 
efficiency,  we  must  also  control  for  other  factors  that  could  result  in  utilization 
differences across market areas.  Otherwise, the omission of variables that are correlated 
with both ownership mix and the measures of output could lead us to draw incorrect 
inferences  from  our  empirical  results.  Following  the  conceptual  model,  these  other 
influences can be broken down into the aforementioned demand-side variables,  j D  and 
supply-side variables  k S .  
Demand-side  variables  affecting  hospital  care  utilization  include  indicators  of 
population size, population density, the age composition of the population, the level of 
income and its distribution in the area, the presence and prevalence of disabilities among   11 
the  population,  the  percentage  of  uninsured  individuals  and  the  type  of  insurance 
coverage  (e.g.,  HMO  penetration  rate  and  Medicare  managed  care  penetration  rate), 
competitiveness  of  the  HMO  insurance  market,  the  availability  of  community  health 
centers as an alternative to hospitals, and environmental conditions (e.g., unemployment, 
crime, and housing). These demand-side variables are intended to control for differences 
in the willingness and ability to pay for hospital services across market areas. Supply-side 
variables are fewer in number and include population density (as a proxy for the price of 
land), the presence of non-teaching hospitals (as a surrogate for quality of care), and the 
number of hospitals per capita. By construction, each measure of output, such as the 
number of admissions per capita, captures the average amount observed for the typical 
hospital  in  each  MSA.  Thus,  the  dramatic  case-mix  and  quality  of  care  differences 
normally observed  among hospitals within a  given metropolitan area are likely to be 
neutralized through the averaging process such that the average outputs are more similar, 
in  terms  of  quality  and  case-mix,  across  MSAs  (Keeler  and  Ying,  1996).  We  also 
controlled for individual state effects using a fixed-effects model specification to capture 
any omitted variables that may vary systematically across states.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
The multiple regression equations for the six different measures of output are estimated 
by the ordinary least square procedure. White’s (1980) test did not detect the presence of 
heteroscasticity. Each independent variable’s coefficient estimate and its corresponding t-
statistic (in absolute terms) are reported in table 2. The six regression equations explain 
between 48 and 80 percent of the variation in the various measures of output.    12 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Looking across the various columns, it can be noted that the coefficient estimates 
on the not-for-profit and public hospital market shares are remarkably similar across the 
six regression equations in terms of their signs and magnitudes.  This finding suggests 
that both types of nonprofit hospital organizations exert a similar marginal impact on 
efficiency. More specifically, the coefficient estimates are negative on both the not-for-
profit and public hospital market shares in five of the six equations. Recall that a negative 
coefficient  estimate  indicates  an  overrepresentation  of  a  particular  type  of  hospital 
ownership from an efficiency perspective. For two of the five equations, inpatient beds 
and admissions, the coefficient estimates are statistically different from zero on the not-
for-profit hospital market share and for three equation, inpatient beds, admissions, and 
days, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant on the public hospital market 
share. From an inpatient care efficiency perspective, these results suggest that not-for-
profit and public hospitals may be overly dominant in the typical market area. That is, 
more quality of inpatient care per dollar might  be realized by somehow growing the 
market share of for-profit hospitals.  
However, notice in the outpatient visits equation that both the not-for-profit and 
public  hospital  market  shares  possess  positive  and  statistically  significant  parameter 
estimates. Taken alone, this result suggests that not-for-profit and public hospitals should 
participate more extensively in the outpatient care sector of the hospital industry because 
they are underrepresented from an efficiency perspective. Our only reticence in drawing 
this  particular  conclusion  is  that  the  measure  of  market  share  is  based  on  hospital 
admissions and not outpatient visits. Data limitations preclude us from constructing a   13 
measure of market share based on other measures of output and, unfortunately, we do not 
know the strength of the correlation between market shares based on inpatient admissions 
and outpatient visits. However, considering that the outpatient facilities of hospitals often 
compete with physician clinics that are organized on a for-profit basis, it may not be too 
surprising that nonprofit organizations are underrepresented in the outpatient sector from 
an efficiency perspective.  
Assuming that our results for the outpatient visits equation are plausible, can we 
draw any conclusion about the overall efficiency of the hospital ownership mix in the 
typical MSA? We can if we know something about the relative value that society assigns 
to the two types of hospital care. For instance, suppose we just focus on the regression 
results for hospital admissions since they mirror the results for inpatient beds (as well as 
inpatient days and surgeries but not as precisely). Using the coefficient estimates on the 
not-for-profit (-0.68) and public (-0.70) shares in the inpatient admissions equation, it can 
be determined that a one-percentage point increase in the shares of each type of hospital 
will  reduce  the  number  of  inpatient  visits  per  1,000  population  by  .68  and  .70, 
respectively.  Evaluated  at  the  sample  mean  for  inpatient  admissions  (118  per  1,000 
population), it follows that a one-percentage point increase in the two shares reduces 
inpatient admissions by .57 and .59 percent.  
Following the same procedure for outpatient visits, it can be determined that the 
number of visits increases by .77 and .69 percent with respect to a one-percentage point 
increase in the market share of not-for-profit and public hospitals. Thus, if society values 
inpatient care and outpatient care equally, one might draw the conclusion that a greater 
presence  of  not-for-profit  and  public  hospitals  would  benefit  society  from  an  overall   14 
efficiency  perspective  because  the  percentage  gain  in  outpatient  visits  outweighs  the 
percentage loss in inpatient care. However, society most likely does not value equally 
both types of hospital care. For one reason, many visits to the outpatient care facility of a 
hospital are not the result of a life-threatening situation. In fact, notice in table 2 that the 
market shares of not-for-profit and public hospitals are not statistically  related to the 
number of emergency room visits, a situation where the medical attention may be life 
saving in nature.  
Another  reason  why  the  two  types  of  care  cannot  be  treated  equally  is  that 
expenditures on inpatient care have tended to dwarf spending on outpatient care on a per 
unit basis. In 2000, for example, outpatient revenues amounted to $6,177 per discharge 
whereas inpatient revenues equaled $229 per visit.
6 Using these values to weigh the loss 
of inpatient admissions and gain of outpatient care resulting from a one-percentage point 
increase in the market shares, it can be determined that the losses amount to $4,200 for 
the not-for-profit share ($6,177 x 0.68) and $4,323 for the public hospital market share 
($6,177 x 0.70). The corresponding benefits equal $3,073 ($229 x 13.42) and $2,792 
($229 x 12.19).  Thus, according to these calculations, a marginal expansion of the not-




This paper offers a test of the efficiency of the ownership mix in various hospital services 
markets  across  the  U.S.    When  consumers  lack  sufficient  information  about  hospital 
quality, the general notion is that nonprofit organizations generate societal benefits by 
offering (and signaling) quality assurance, but they may simultaneously result in higher 
production costs because of less attention devoted to efficiency.  The opposite scenario   15 
holds for for-profit organizations. Thus, a mix of ownership types in the marketplace may 
keep quality and costs under control as a result of competitive spillovers. 
In this study we proposed that the efficiency of the ownership mix might be inferred 
by  viewing  how  the  ownership  mix  affects  utilization  through  the  use  of  multiple 
regression analyses. Our empirical results suggest that too many not-for-profit and public 
hospitals may characterize the typical hospital services market of the U.S., at least in 
1999.    As  a  result,  greater  quality  of  care  per  dollar  could  possibly  be  achieved  by 
encouraging more for-profit hospitals to enter into some market areas of the U.S. Local 
and state policy makers could attract more for-profit hospitals by offering inducements 
such as zoning waivers and construction bond subsidies.  
However, before policies of this kind are actually enacted it may be beneficial to 
replicate this study by obtaining richer data and by using a much larger panel data set of 
individual hospitals. Data of this kind are not available to us. A larger panel set would 
allow  the  investigator  to  control  for  a  large  number  of  hospital-specific  features  by 
employing fixed effects and may also permit some changes in the market shares of the 
different types of hospitals over time. Lastly, a richer data set might allow market share 
to be constructed with various measures of output or revenues involving inpatient and 
outpatient care.   At the very least, our study here provides an initializing template to help 
organize and execute a more ambitious study on such an important and timely topic.    16 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics of Model Variables 
 
  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  SD 
  
             Output Measures (Q) 
 
       
Inpatient beds per 1,000 population  2.70  4.80  1.52  0.74 
Admissions per 1,000 population  118.43  194.00  70.00  24.10 
Inpatient days per 1,000 population  688.37  1,560.79  347.16  206.10 
Surgeries per 1,000 population  93.79  179.06  12.47  28.51 
Outpatient visits per 1,000 population  1742.87  3,332.17  717.45  622.34 
Emergency room visits per 1,000 population  349.03  610.00  178.00  75.57 
                   
            Ownership Form 
 
       
% Admissions in not-for-profit hospitals  74.31  100.00  11.40  24.41 
% Admissions in government hospitals  13.97  62.70  0.00  14.90 
                   
            Control Variables 
 
       
% < 65 years of age that are uninsured  16.78  34.00  7.70  6.04 
Population (in logs)  13.94  16.07  12.40  0.81 
% < 18 in poverty  14.43  31.3  6.30  4.70 
% >=18 in poverty  10.00  19.90  5.10  2.71 
% > 65 years of age in poverty  8.66  18.90  4.80  2.51 
Median household income (in logs)  10.71  11.22  10.36  0.16 
%  College graduates  54.57  69.9  38.5  7.19 
HHI of HMO plans  0.72  0.92  0.38  0.12 
HMO penetration rate  36.20  74.80  10.30  15.52 
Managed care penetration rate  22.08  54.50  0.10  15.76 
% >= 65 years of age  12.76  28.50  7.60  3.62 
% < 18 years of age (children)  25.27  31.70  18.10  2.57 
%  Elderly that are disabled  41.08  49.00  33.30  3.61 
%  Children that are disabled  8.15  10.60  6.40  0.88 
% Adults disabled  18.83  25.60  11.50  2.89 
Community Health Ctr. in area (1=yes; 0=no)  0.94  1.00  0.00  0.23 
% White  75.36  96.80  21.30  13.07 
% Black  11.89  46.70  1.00  9.32 
% Asian  4.29  46.00  0.40  6.22 
% Hispanic  11.40  57.30  0.70  11.94 
% Unemployed  5.65  12.00  3.00  1.75 
Crimes per 10,000 population  448.33  861.00  169.00  130.71 
Medicaid spending per recipient  1,229.78  2,263.00  979.00  266.49 
Owner occupancy rate  65.68  80.00  30.70  7.61 
Population density  887.69  12,687.00  39.00  1,619.46 
% Non-teaching hospitals  45.80  100.00  0.80  22.71 
Hospitals per capita  1.19E-05  2.50E-05  3.87E-06  3.87E-06 
  
   18 
Table 2: Regression Results
* 
(t-statistics in parentheses; intercept and state fixed-effects not shown) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
                   
             Ownership Form 
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(0.520247)   19 







































*  Models differ only by dependent variable. Where the dependent variable for each model is the following: 
  Model 1: Inpatient beds per 1,000 population; 
  Model 2: Admissions per 1,000 population; 
  Model 3: Inpatient days per 1,000 population; 
  Model 4: Surgeries per 1,000 population; 
  Model 5: Outpatient visits per 1,000 population; 
  Model 6: Emergency room visits per 1,000 population.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In recent work by Kessler and McClellan (2002) examining the hospital market, areas with a stronger 
presence of for-profits have 2.4% lower overall expenditures, but virtually the same patient outcomes. 
 
2 Svorney finds empirically that physician licensure leads to a reduced consumption of physician services. 
That is, physician licensure increased entry costs (supply) by more than it increased consumer benefits 
from quality assurance (demand). Thus her results provide support for the special interest theory of 
physician licensure.  
 
3 We categorize the difference types of hospitals based on ownership as private for-profit, private not-for-
profit and public or government. Thus, the term “nonprofit” refers to both private not-for-profit and public 
organizations in this paper. 
 
4 In fact, an inverted U relationship might hold between each ownership market share and an output 
measure. However, sufficient variation in ownership does not exist to map out an entire inverted U 
relationship. We can only identify the direction of the slope.  
 
5 See http://www.ahrq.gov/data/safetynet/documentation/msatab1.xls (accessed December 1, 2004) 
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